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ABSTRACT
Many towns and cities are faced with unemployment or
underemployment, underutilized or blighted areas, and tax
bases not expanding as quickly as servite needs. These
challenges have led many municipalities to create Industrial
Development Corporations. To achieve the desired goals of job
creation and retention, expansion of the tax base, and an
improved use of underutilized or blighted areas requires a
successful implementation strategy by this organization. An
effective implementation strategy is influenced by three main
factors: the initial conditions and resources, the tools
empowered to the Industrial Development Corporation, and
organizational factors.
Three Massachusetts case studies, Boston, Lynn, and Wareham,
were examined to determine the important elements of each of
these three factors. While the powers an Industrial
Development Corporation has and the organizational factors it
requires are similar for each town or city, each has its own
unique set of circumstances and environment. Because of this,
each municipality requires a tailor-made implementation
strategy. The important environmental elements that
differentiate the strategies include: size, location, access,
industrial base, macro-economic trends, land availability, and
stage of growth of the Industrial Development Corporation.
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INTRODUCTION
The manufacturing base in the nation is declining, and with
it goes an important source of high quality jobs, particularly
for those without a college education. Part of the economic
development strategy employed by many cities to ameliorate the
community impact of job loss is to establish an Industrial
Development Corporation.
In Massachusetts the term Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation (EDIC) is used for Industrial
Development Corporations. These are quasi-public agencies
with a mandate to generate jobs, increase the tax base, and
improve blighted areas. EDICs accomplish this by designing
projects that are attractive to private businesses needs.
Through a variety of services an EDIC promotes community
growth by supporting industrial development activities that
might not have occurred without public intervention. This is
a difficult task particularly because it is counter to the
national economic trends leading to the deindustrialization
of the United States.
EDICs are an important tool in the economic development
process, and their charter and resources greatly influence
their capacity to achieve success. If the goals of the EDIC
are to be accomplished, understanding the key factors in the
implementation process is crucial. Therefore, the goal of
this analysis is to identify the important factors in an
EDIC's strategy that make implementation effective.
An organization's strategy is the process it follows to
plan, implement, and ultimately achieve a goal. There are
three factors that influence the strategy a municipality must
follow to implement an EDIC effectively--environmental
factors, tools, and organizational factors. First, each EDIC
has certain constraints and initial resources defined by the
environment in which it exists. Second, the enabling
legislation empowers an EDIC with certain tools which can be
used to leverage these resources to help reach its goals. And
third, there are organizational factors necessary for
successful implementation. Given differences in the
environment, the available powers and their subsequent use,
and the organizational context, each EDIC will pursue its
industrial development goals in different ways. The objective
of this thesis is to show the relationship of these three
factors with an EDIC's implementation strategy and to indicate
the implications of these relationships to newly created
EDICs.
Organization of Thesis
In the first chapter economic development is defined as a
basis for understanding why there is public intervention.
Also included are arguments why EDICs are chosen as an
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economic development organization. The last two subsections
of this chapter define implementation and evaluation of
economic development programs and provide the conceptual
framework used to analyze the case studies.
In Chapter II the reasons why industrial development is an
important economic development strategy are examined. The
important characteristics of industrial development are
outlined as a way of understanding what is needed for an EDIC
to attract firms to ensure a successful industrial
development. This lays the groundwork for understanding the
use of the various powers of an EDIC and the impact of the
different environmental factors.
In the following chapter, EDICs are more fully examined.
Their creation, goals, functions, and organizational structure
are described. This provides a basis to examine the three
case studies in the next chapter.
Three EDIC case studies--Boston, Lynn, and Wareham--are
described in Chapter IV and were chosen to represent the range
of EDICs in Massachusetts. These cases have been developed
through interviews and review of legislation and other
material. The EDICs are examined as they change over time and
analyzed with respect to their environment and use of powers.
By examining how they have evolved and used their powers,
common elements are identified in Chapter V which indicate
successful implementation. The relative success of each and
their contributions and problems will be evaluated at this
time. The analysis will consider what is unique or unusual
about each case, what patterns can be seen, and what can be
learned from their experiences. A municipality implementing
an EDIC must develop its own unique strategy; however, heeding
the examples of other EDICs as outlined here can lead to the
avoidance of pitfalls and an easier path to success.
CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
It may be helpful initially to define economic development
because economic development strategies may assume many
different forms. The goal of economic development is the
improvement of both the standard of living and the quality of
life of the citizens of a community. Economic development can
be further defined as changing and improving the economic base
of the city. This improvement of the economic base is
accomplished through investment of the existing resources--
financial, social, political, intellectual, or physical.
Given limited resources to invest, the public objective
becomes the ability to expand optimally the current assets of
the city, thus increasing its economic base.
Within this context, the inherent question of efficiency
versus equity must be examined. For instance, if a city
considers redevelopment of a site as part of its economic
development program, it must understand its ultimate goals.
The site may not be currently at its "highest and best" use
and there may be a way to make better use of the property.
However, there may also be a greater social benefit to
redeveloping the site based on a different distribution of
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resources. For example, choosing efficiency may generate more
property taxes by promoting the redevelopment to its "highest
and best" use. Whereas, equity may promote more and better
paying jobs if a different alternative for use is chosen.
In particular, this distinction, which each EDIC must
address either implicitly or explicitly when planning its
implementation strategy, manifests itself in the issue of
increasing tax revenues and increasing job creation.
Efficiency and equity are not necessarily compatible.
Primarily, increasing tax revenues is a wealth creation
problem, whereas job creation is a distributional problem.
Creating jobs and broadening the tax base are the two goals
cited in all the EDIC programs examined. Although there are
benefits to choosing either one of these goals, there are also
tradeoffs. For instance, a site may be used for a warehouse
because it is the use that pays the most for the land. Some
jobs may be created; however, they are fewer in number and
relatively lower paying than other alternatives. This is
because the space a warehouse needs is great compared to the
number of workers employed there, so the space per employee
is higher than for most other uses. Also, there may be other
negative impacts on the neighboring community, such as more
truck traffic than an alternative use.
Since the wages of high-quality jobs are the basis for a
worker's standard of living, one important aspect of economic
development is access to these jobs. High-quality jobs are
those which offer security, high wages, benefits (such as
health insurance), and room for advancement.' In addition,
the places of operation, both in physical and operational
manners, must be acceptable to the municipality. In other
words, the municipality wants to ensure its citizens not only
jobs, but also a safe and healthy environment. The
municipality also desires an adequate tax base to be able to
provide services needed to promote a good quality of life for
its citizens.
Choice of Economic Development Organization
There are, in fact, a number of different forms of economic
development organizations.2 Each organization has a different
set of powers, tools, ways to obtain funding, and tasks that
will affect the local economy in a unique way. Depending on
the reason a city feels it is not obtaining its goals or what
a city believes to be the obstacle to achieving its goals will
ultimately determine which organizational form it chooses.
This section first outlines the issues that must be considered
in choosing among these different types of organizations.
Next, it details the reasons why an EDIC would be chosen.
In choosing an economic development prototype, it is
important to understand the reasons why the private sector is
not investing as would be expected or desired. For instance,
the private sector would choose to develop a site to the
"highest and best" use which is the wealth maximizing choice.
This may not take into account the benefits that another use
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may bring to the site, such as an increase in the number of
high-quality jobs available to the community. These jobs may
mean more to the community, as a whole, than the "highest and
best" use would; therefore, some form of public intervention
may be required to realize these benefits.
Another aspect is that many cities have become public
entrepreneurs and land developers primarily as a way to
leverage private sector investment for economic development.
There are advantages and disadvantages in being a public
developer. For instance, one advantage of a private developer
versus a public developer is the ability to make quicker
decisions. The public sector, even when using a quasi-public
agency, is still subject to certain procedures for
accountability which can result in a longer decision making
process. On the other hand private money is not as patient
as public money.
The goals of the public and private sector are different.
Whereas, the private sector is motivated by profit
maximization, the public sector has the public welfare in mind
and is often trying to stimulate private sector investment.
The public sector gets involved with projects that would not
necessarily get done with the most public benefit, or would
not get done at all.
When a city engages in real estate development, it needs to
make business-based decisions. Public-private development
decisions evolve from complicated negotiations which are based
on confidentiality and proprietary information. This
confidentiality is needed to secure private sector
involvement. However, this is a problem when public money is
involved, because a closed process may preclude accountability
and public review and evaluation.
Once public intervention has been accepted, a city must
consider the following factors when considering an economic
development structure. The first factor is understanding the
barriers to the access of resources. Sometimes access is all
that is needed. An example is providing access to jobs
outside the neighborhood. Information, transportation, job
referrals or job training may be the means to achieve this.
A job training program may be the organizational answer to
increasing access to jobs. Another example is access to
financing. Since financing facilitates the investment
process, the ability to obtain funds from such sources as
banks or foundations can be instrumental for some small
businesses. An Industrial Development Finance Corporation or
Local Finance Corporation may give the necessary access to
funds.
Yet another factor that is important to consider when
choosing an economic development strategy is the needs of the
city. In particular, what jobs are needed, and, in turn, what
skills and resources are underutilized and need to be
developed. In addition, it is important to understand the
political framework within which the organization implementing
the strategy is working. There must be the appropriate
commitment, support, and coordination from other community
departments and agencies.
Other factors that influence the choice of the economic
development organization include:
o size and capacity of a city--a large city may need more
organizations to carry out all of the activities it
needs;
o economic circumstances and priorities;
o level of commitment of the public and private sectors to
economic development;
o actors in the process, including the skills and expertise
available;
o stage of planning and implementation;
o economic development strategy and tools needed;
o political environment;
o regional issues;
o resources available, in particular financial.3
It is assumed in this thesis that an analysis has been
performed to determine the type of organization needed for the
objectives desired, and that an EDIC is the appropriate
choice. EDICs, which are mandated to create and retain jobs,
increase the tax base, improve blighted areas, and respond to
the concerns of private businesses, are chosen for their
powers to develop and manage industrial sites. These powers
will be outlined further in Chapter III.
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There are organizations other than EDICs which can perform
public development; however, none have the same broad
combination of powers or as focused a goal. (See Appendix A
for a chart comparing the various powers of the different
organizations which do public development.) The organization
with the most similar powers is a Redevelopment Authority
(RA). Often an EDIC is chosen instead of, or in addition to,
an RA because RAs have developed poor public images over the
years from urban renewal.
An EDIC is a quasi-public agency, and as such has many of
the same powers as a public agency, such as eminent domain.
The prime difference is that it is more immune to political
pressure than a city agency. Consequently, a quasi-public
agency is better able to make business-based decisions.
In addition, quasi-public agencies have more flexibility in
staffing since their salaries for professionals are
competitive with the private sector. Specific expertise in
development or finance may be necessary, and it is easier for
a quasi-public agency than a public agency to assemble this.
Another advantage is that public authorities can use financial
markets to raise capital from the private sector for
investment in public amenities. Basically, public authorities
"are corporations without stockholders, political
jurisdictions without voters or taxpayers. "*
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Implementation
This section will explain implementation to provide a
framework for future analysis. Implementation, as defined in
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, means "to carry out :
ACCOMPLISH; esp : to give practical effect to and ensure of
actual fulfillment by concrete measures". Pressman and
Wildavsky further define implementation to be "the ability to
achieve the predicted consequences after the initial
conditions have been met"', and as a "process of interaction
between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving
them. "" The achievement of the objective is actually
determined either by a successful or faulty policy decision
and by a successful or faulty implementation.
Therefore, assuming that the underlying theory for the
creation of EDICs is correct, the implementation of the
program becomes critical to the success of the program to
alleviate the specified societal problems. And, while policy
is transformed by implementation through the use of resources
and the interpretation of objectives, implementation is shaped
by policy which defines the playing arena, identifies the
participants and range of tools permissible, and supplies the
resources.
When evaluating implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky
contend that the achievement of the desired results depends
upon intrinsic qualities and external conditions.
Implementation can be hindered by delays, poor policy, and a
lack of participant cooperation. Delays stem from the number
of decision points and the participants at each of the
decision points. Each of these participants has their own
priorities, intensity of preference in the level of agreement,
level of resources, and control over the process and
resources. As the quantity and dispersion of each of these
items becomes larger, the likelihood for delay and lack of
completion becomes greater.8
Correspondingly, when a program manager does not control
participants whose cooperation or assistance is required, a
serious problem for implementation can ensue. The link
between the adoption of a policy and its operation is weak,
this too causes problems. 9
This complexity implies that the axiom Keep It Simple is
important. However, the more automatic the tool and the
easier it is to administer, the less effective the program is
in achieving the objectives and the less political support can
be expected for the project. Also, the ability to learn from
previous mistakes and the political feasibility and
responsiveness are important ingredients to successful
implementation.0
EDICs are actually delivery systems of a set of tools to
achieve the desired objectives. An EDIC is empowered with
certain tools which enables it to achieve desired objectives.




Effectiveness is defined by the ability to reach the
assigned objective. This is accomplished by expanding the
existing capacities, including all skills, resources, and
information, through influence and control. The efficiency
of an EDIC is defined in two ways, through cost-effectiveness
and through the contribution to the overall social welfare."
While this thesis does not analyze if an EDIC is the most
effective organization to obtain the goals desired, it is
important to understand the issues that go into the
evaluation, if not the methodology. The success of a program
depends heavily on how the goals and objectives are defined
and by whom and for whom they are made. The goals and
objectives of the program should reflect the values of the
community. For instance, not only can quantity be important,
but quality also can define how well goals are achieved. In
particular, the number of jobs created by a program or
organization is important, but just as important is the
quality of these jobs., Are they high paying? Do they offer
long term security? Do they offer benefits? Are these jobs
in a safe environment? Also, while the realization of the
goal--such as the creation of good jobs--is an important
factor, so is the timeliness of the result and its cost.
When evaluating economic development programs, the most
common evaluation is the number of jobs promised by the
program versus the number connected with its completion.
This, however, can give an overly favorable picture of the
program." Two reasons for overly optimistic evaluations are
cause and effect and opportunity costs.
First, a firm's decision to locate in a specific location,
develop a new product or expand may not be the direct result
of the program, yet they still receive the benefits of the
program for doing what they would have done without it.
The second reason for an overly optimistic picture is that
even when the program affects the decision, there are
opportunity costs elsewhere. The decision to use resources
in a particular program decreases the resources available for
other programs. The actual net affect of the program is not
the total number of jobs created, but the total change in the
economy, such as the total number of jobs created, minus the
affect on the economy of the most feasible alternative.
Markets, labor cost and availability, transportation access
and costs, availability of raw materials, and the cost of land
are all important considerations to a firm's initial decision
to relocate or expand sand then where to do this. Therefore,
many economic development programs, particularly financial
ones, only occasionally influence the choice of a specific
site. And this occurs only where it will locate within a
given region. However, the effectiveness of these programs
can affect economic growth by stimulating the expansion and
growth of existing firms in the region that may not have done
so otherwise.
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EDICs evaluate themselves primarily through the number of
jobs they create and by the increase in the tax base. They
rarely explicitly examine the quality of the jobs they create,
although they target the industrial and manufacturing base in
an effort to create high-quality jobs. Although EDICs target
industrial and manufacturing firms which historically have
high wages, they also target small businesses to diversify the
economic base of the community. Small new businesses often
offer few or no benefits and low wages. They also offer
little security since almost 65% of new businesses fail within
their first year.14 This contradiction in goals can lead to
difficulty in assessing the success or failure of the program.
In this chapter the reasons for public intervention, the
choice for the type of intervention, and why an EDIC might be
chosen by a city are examined. Implementation and
effectiveness are discussed as background for the analysis of
the case studies. In the next chapter, the needs of
manufacturing firms are identified.
CHAPTER II
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter industrial development is examined to
better understand why cities want to nurture and promote
manufacturing firms and how the city can attract and retain
these firms. A cities' implementation strategy depends upon
meeting the needs of the firms as outlined here.
Promoting industrial development and the reuse of unused or
underused industrial sites is part of the economic development
picture. Jobs promote growth in the standard of living and
strengthen the local economy. In order to find ways to create
and retain jobs and to increase the tax base, communities have
looked to industrial development.
Specifically, most heavy manufacturing positions are
relatively high paying in comparison to those in the service
sector. Not only do service positions pay less than
comparable manufacturing positions, but blue collar workers
do not have the necessary skills for the high paying service
positions. It is also much more difficult to advance to
higher paying positions in the service sector primarily due
to dichotomized job opportunities, job opportunities that are
either high-wage and high-skilled or low-waged and low-
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skilled. Without the skills for high-wage jobs, heads of
households are relegated to low-wage jobs.15
When manufacturing leaves, the workers, site, and buildings
are often left underutilized. Tax base is not maximized, and
the empty and boarded up site leaves a big scar that can
affect the whole area. Disinvestment can lead to more
disinvestment and result in a spiral of decline for the area.
These sites can be in critical locations, near transportation
access and close to the waterfront, increasing the loss to the
community.
Manufacturing Needs
As mentioned in the Chapter I, a city or town chooses
industrial development as a strategy for economic development.
Industrial development strategies include attracting and
promoting new business, retaining industry in the community,
and expanding existing firms." In order to attract, retain,
or expand businesses in the area, municipalities must
understand and meet their needs. Since most firms are located
in industrial parks or industrially zoned areas, it is
important to identify the characteristics these parks and
areas need.
The characteristics of an industrial park which attract
businesses are:
o access to highway, rail, airport, and water;
o infrastructure;




o cheap properly zoned land and low property taxes;
o enough land for future growth;
o be in or near the market place (seventy-mile radius);
o visibility; and
o amenities and incentives."
Other characteristics include proximity to the CEO's home and
education and housing for management and employees.
Manufacturers move because of these same characteristics.
Interface, a New York City research organization surveyed
sixty-two manufacturing firms in 1985 "to develop factually-
derived policy recommendations to improve the quality and
effectiveness of New York's assistance to its remaining
manufacturers. "18 They reported that 48% of the firms cited
the need for space to expand/start a new operation as one of
their decisions to move. Rent increases, at 31%, were the
second most cited reason for moving." Businesses move to
areas which address these needs, the most important, not
surprisingly, being the cost and amount of space. The
relocation choice is usually within close proximity to the
market place, ie. they move no further than the suburbs. In
the Interface survey, 68% of the firms cited the proximity to
Manhattan as one of their reasons for moving to New Jersey.20
Location can be a very important decision for the use of a
site or area of a city/region. Real estate cannot be moved.
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If it is in the wrong location for current demands, if it is
adjacent to incompatible use, or if it is environmentally
problematic, its potential uses can be limited. Location is
very important since it is a main determinant to the value of
the land. Different uses can afford different land costs;
and industrial space requires cheap land, particularly in
relation to office space."
Access is a critical ingredient in the locational issue.
Location near the labor market and needed services is among
the most important factors leading to site location decisions
by manufacturing firms."
Some cities and towns begin with an existing industrial
base which they want to support, while others have little or
none. The problems faced with trying to retain industry and
reuse underutilized industrial space versus trying to attract
new industry to a clear site have some similar
characteristics. To start with, both require infrastructure,
low crime, low cost of space, and a low cost of doing
business. However, the reuse of an underutilized industrial
site has restrictions that clear land does not.
If the land has never been used for industry, attracting
new industry to the area may be constrained by zoning and
neighborhood objections, whereas an underutilized site has a
different set of constraints. Many of the industrial sites
are located in an area with all the infrastructure in place
and often already used to capacity-. The existing buildings,
due to size and type, place restrictions on the ability for
adaptation. Zoning restrictions and public opinion can also
create problems when trying to reuse the site, although, as
will be seen in the case of Boston Marine Industrial Park,
sometimes it can help the site.
Another constraint is that existing industrial facilities
almost always come with some form of environmental problem
such as asbestos, Polychlorinated Byphenyls (PCBs), lead, or
a chemical spill, which can be extremely costly to rectify,
driving up the cost of the property dramatically. As a result
of these types of environmental problems, the original firm
has the legal liability to clean up the site; however, they
often do not have the resources or economic motivation to
clean up the site for reuse. Unfortunately, cities often have
little available cleared space appropriate for industrial use
and must rely upon the reuse of an industrial site for their
projects.
If a city has vacant industrial land, the reuse of
industrial sites 300,QOO square feet or smaller is handled
relatively well by the private sector. Real estate brokers
are able to market these size spaces fairly easily. Light
manufacturing, warehouses and incubators do not have space
needs of more than 300,000 square feet; they are actually more
often in the 30,000 - 100,000 square-foot range. Breaking up
large industrial space for smaller tenants is a possibility,
but only accounts for a quarter of the market. Single tenant
buildings account for 73% of the national market."
In order to increase the value of a large industrial site
for a firm that plans to close it down, a workable reuse plan
with community support is needed." It is rare to find a
single tenant for any facility 300,000 square feet or larger.
Public support is a crucial ingredient for this plan in order
to get the cooperation needed for implementing it, for
instance for zoning or use changes. Public incentives
contribute to the strength of the deal and leverage of other
private investment.
Leveraging the private sector in local economic development
is fairly widespread. Over the course of the past twenty
years the burden of public sector incentives for private
investment has shifted from the federal government to
municipalities." Much of the theory behind an EDIC is based
on this premise, to encourage industry not only to come back
in the inner city, but not to leave in the first place; thus,
retaining as well as creating jobs and increasing the tax
base.
Manufacturing jobs have been targeted by many cities as a
source of high-quality jobs. In order to attract
manufacturing firms to an area there are certain needs of
these firms that must be addressed which include location,
access, existing industrial base, and other constraints such
as land availability, zoning, and environmental problems.
These needs determine the strategy a city follows based on its
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environmental factors.
EDICs were created specifically for industrial development.
The next chapter examines the EDIC in detail, focusing on the




ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS
Changing economic conditions in Massachusetts in the last
several decades has contributed to the increased popularity
and formation of EDICs. These changes include increasing
unemployment and changes in the composition of the labor
force. In this chapter, the changes are outlined and seen in
relation to the formation of EDICs. The goals, legislation,
and powers are described.
Initial Conditions
Massachusetts, and particularly Boston, encountered
economic stagnation in the 1960s and early 1970s. The urban
population was decreasing and unemployment increasing.
Boston's population decreased 8.0% from 1960 to 1970 and 12.2%
from 1970 to 1980, while the suburbs grew rapidly.
Unemployment for Boston in 1970 was 4.9%, but by 1975 had
risen to 12.8%. Massachusetts' unemployment similarly
increased from 4.6% in 1970 to 11.2% in 1975. Both of these
1975 unemployment rates were substantially higher than the
national average of 8.5%27. These unusually high unemployment
rates were in part exacerbated by a national recession in the
mid 1970s.
Concurrently, there was an underlying change in the
composition of the labor force. What was happening to Boston
was not unique; these trends were linked to national economic
changes, in particular, the change to a service-based rather
than manufacturing-based economy. In 1949, 33% of all
employees nationally were employed in manufacturing, 12% were
employed in the service industries (health, education,
business, social, professional, repair, amusement, lodging,
and personal services), and 25.3% worked in broadly defined
services (transportation communications, public utilities,
finance, insurance, and real estate). By 1979, only 23.4%
were employed in the manufacturing sector, while the service
industry accounted for 19.1% and broad services accounted for
30.3%28. In Boston between 1960 and 1975, manufacturing
declined 42.9%, from 88,102 jobs to 50,334 jobs".
These economic conditions in Boston stimulated the creation
of the first EDIC in the state in 1971. Wareham followed a
year later, with the help of the Executive Office of Community
Development (EOCD), because of the town selectmen's desire to
improve the historically low income levels of families in the
town, at that time fourth lowest in the state behind Boston,
Chelsea, and Gay Head.3 Lynn had similar declines in the
manufacturing base as Boston, but it did not establish an EDIC
until 1978 when the latter was needed to develop a specific
industrial project.
Goals
As was the case in the three examples just given, EDICs are
created as part of a strategy for economic development. As
specifically stated in the legislation, an EDIC is the
implementing organization of an economic development plan for
"the elimination of substandard conditions and the prevention
of their recurrence [which] is necessary to retain existing
industries, and attract new industries, and promote the sound
economic growth of the city."31  This is to be done because
of the "persistent unemployment and underemployment... caused
in part by industrial and manufacturing companies moving from
the city. "32  Also noted in the legislation, is that the
private sector has not and cannot provide the industrial sites
necessary without public intervention. Another reason for
creating an EDIC is to increase the tax base of the city.
However, as employment in the manufacturing sector declines,
an EDIC can hope to improve only some of the business
conditions for manufacturing firms and stem the tide of
outmigration; they have little power to reverse trends
influencing improved technology and automation, imports, and
nation-wide shifts towards a service-based economy.
Legislation
The boundaries of an EDIC are constantly in question as to
the line between strictly industrial projects and those that
complement and supplement but are not industrial and
manufacturing projects. Each city has interpreted the
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legislation in its own way for its own set of circumstances,
just as Lynn did for the Heritage State Park, a project which
provided no industrial jobs directly.
The first EDIC in Massachusetts was established in Boston
in 1971 under home-rule petition. Of the nineteen EDICs
currently active, Boston is among only three which were
established through home-rule petition by a Special Act of the
Legislature; the other two being Lynn and Leominster. The
remaining EDICs, including Wareham, were created through
Chapter 121C of the Massachusetts General Laws. (See
Appendix B for a list of EDICs.)
The legislative origin has made very little practical
difference in operation. However, in order to use Chapter
121C legislation the municipality must be able to show
substantial unemployment (as defined by the Department of
Labor). Since the early 1980s, it has been difficult to meet
the thresholds established by the Department of Labor because
Massachusetts has not had substantial unemployment throughout
most of the 1980s. Rather than unemployment, there are the
persistent problems of underemployment, blighted areas, and
the need for an increased tax base; hence, it becomes
necessary to use special legislation to create an EDIC.
Cities also prefer this because it is easier to get through
the process than Chapter 121C. Also, special legislation does
not require review by the Executive Office of Economic
Development (EOCD) and allows the -municipality to determine
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the composition of the board of directors. Due to less
specific interpretation of economic development, the special
legislation allows for a more liberal interpretation of the
tasks and projects permitted.
Most EDICs created have been for individual towns or
cities. However, Chapter 121C section 3 allows for two or
more municipalities to form a regional EDIC. Northfield/
Erving is the only known one and it has become inactive by
allowing all board members' terms to expire. Regional EDICs
were originally designed to encourage more regional planning
efforts and to address and improve the region's overall
economic development, particularly in the siting of industrial
sites. Creation of regional EDICs, it was thought, would
offer opportunities for cities to share the costs of technical
assistance and marketing, increase cooperation in
infrastructure provision, prevent the excessive use of eminent
domain to assemble sites, and reduce the ability of firms to
get public sector concessions by playing one neighboring
municipality against the other.
While very promising in concept, regional EDICs can be
problematic. This is because most cities cannot agree on what
is best for the region if they don't see specific local
advantages. It is also a problem because tax base sharing is
prohibited by Massachusetts State Law.
Powers
EDICs enjoy the strongest development powers of the various
entities created under Massachusetts State Laws. EDICs have
the capability to assemble land, and develop, finance, and
manage the sites. While other economic development
organization possess some combination of these powers, none
perform them all. (See Appendix A for a comparison of the
powers.) In fact, the main function of an EDIC is industrial
real estate development; so, while it has more expansive
development powers, it is much more focused than the other
entities. In particular, EDICs have the power to:
o prepare economic development project plans;
o acquire land, by eminent domain if needed and only
through a two-thirds vote of the municipality, or as
otherwise stipulated in the legislation;
o make improvements necessary for the development of the
site in accordance with the economic development plan;
o develop, sell, convey, lease, mortgage, transfer,
exchange, or otherwise dispose of property;
o borrow and invest money, and issue bonds of the
corporation and revenue bonds;
o accept and receive grants, loans, or advances from
any federal, state or municipal agency;
o finance pollution control facilities;
o construct and improve facilities;
o manage projects, and enter into agreements with public or
private interests for managing the project; and
o act as an Urban Redevelopment Corporation under Chapter
121A.
The EDIC must develop a plan that receives approval of the
municipality. This plan must include site boundaries, land
acquisition, structures to be demolished, removed, or
rehabilitated, redevelopment and general public improvements,
zoning changes if applicable, method of financing and proposed
land uses, maximum densities and building requirements. The
plan must be submitted to the municipality and have a public
hearing, which is advertised in newspapers. Notice of the
hearing also must be given to organizations and persons who
have made a written request to receive notice, to the
Secretary of the Executive Office of Communities and
Development (EOCD), to any agency that has an interest in the
plan, to the State Senators/Representatives who represent the
economic development area, and to each community group
supported by public funds whose territory coincides with the
economic development area. 3
Eminent domain is not encouraged, and as per Chapter 121C,
section 5, part 1, requires a two-thirds vote of the city
council with the approval of the mayor of the city. A public
hearing must be held prior to approval with the advice of the
Department of Commerce and Development and the Secretary of
EOCD.
After an affirmative vote from the municipality and the
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establishment of an EDIC, the board of directors must be
appointed. The composition of the seven person board varies
slightly from Chapter 121C and special legislation EDICs.
Cities using special legislation can choose the representation
of the board. The Chapter 121C board, as determined in the
legislation, must be comprised of:
o one member experienced in industrial development;
o one member experienced in financial matters;
o one member experienced in real estate matters;
o one member experienced in municipal government;
o at least one member representative of low-income people;
o two other members with no specific qualifications.
The appointing municipality designates one of these board
members as chairman and another as vice-chairman. The board
is appointed with staggered terms of three years.
Each municipality creates its own organization, with staff
based on its specific circumstances. Most hire minimal staff,
often working with the economic development department of that
municipality.
In summary, the important functions an EDIC can perform and
tools it can use include planning, land assembly, eminent
domain, infrastructure and facility development, promotion and
marketing, management of property, and financing, including
issuance of bonds, borrowing, and investing funds. In
addition, some EDICs offer technical assistance and job
training. In the next chapter three case studies are examined
and their use of these powers is compared.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDIES -- BOSTON, LYNN, WAREHAM
This chapter presents the case studies (Boston, Lynn, and
Wareham) that serve as a basis for comparing the different
approaches to EDICs. The development of each case and the
changes that occurred over time are explained and in the last
section of this chapter the cases are summarized and compared.
Boston
Creation
As noted earlier, the EDIC of Boston started in a time of
high unemployment and generally poor economic conditions.
George Seybolt was the first chairman of the EDIC Board, and
one of the founding fathers. Then Chief Executive Officer of
the Wm. Underwood Co., Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce,
and board member on nunerous other organizations, Seybolt saw
the plight of Boston manifested by the exodus of blue-collar
jobs. According to him, the backbone of Boston's economy was
the blue-collar worker who lived in triple-deckers, paid the
taxes, voted, and cared about the schools and other services.
The number of these Boston workers declined by 43% between
1960 and 1975."
The political situation was changing at that time. More
power was shifting from the Mayor of Boston to the Statehouse.
Also, more regulations were applied to businesses and there
were changes in zoning making the cost of doing business in
the area higher than ever before. Seybolt realized that
neither the Chamber of Commerce nor any city agency was
effective in meeting the needs of businesses that employed
blue-collar workers. He wanted more political support in
order to stem the flow of industry out of Boston.
Seybolt met with Kevin White, then Mayor of Boston, and
gained political support for his idea. In 1969 White
convinced the City Council to establish the Development and
Industrial Commission. The Commission, composed of fifteen
businessmen and a small staff and headed by Seybolt, began
examining other models from cities such as Saint Louis,
Chicago, and New York. The Commission concluded that an
Industrial Development Corporation was the most appropriate
vehicle to retain businesses and create an atmosphere that
would promote growth. The Commission drafted the bylaws of
the EDIC specifying powers of eminent domain, bond issuance,
and land acquisition and sale. It excluded any control over
zoning, knowing that this would never be approved by the City
Council.
It took six months for the home-rule petition to go from
start to finish before the Legislature passes it in 1971.
This was the start of the first EDIC in Massachusetts. A year
later, in 1972, state-wide enabling legislation was
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established in Chapter 121C of the Massachusetts General Laws.
Seybolt had a strong influence on the direction the EDIC
took.3" Although the board hired the staff and developed the
strategy, Seybolt's influence was strong and evident.
Originally there was a staff of only six people. Although
there was little money from the city council, this suited
Seybolt who wanted the EDIC to be self-sufficient: the less
money received, the fewer favors owed, for instance, in hiring
staff. Currently, Boston EDIC staff is totally supported by
the revenues from projects, primarily the Boston Marine
Industrial Park (BMIP), and receives no city funds for
operating expenses or salaries.
Projects
Even though many studies were commissioned, the Boston EDIC
acquired no real estate prior to Westgate becoming Executive
Director in 1975. Both candidates for Mayor (White and
Timulty) had announced their intent to disband the EDIC after
the 1975 election. It became apparent that a major project,
such as the reuse of the Boston Naval Shipyard in South
Boston, would be needed to make the organization self-
sufficient and to create jobs. (The Boston Naval Shipyard in
South Boston was closed in the early 1970s for political
reasons and subsequently sold in mid-1975 by the United States
Navy.)
There was little unused space available anywhere in Boston,
and there were still fewer sites where neighbors would allow
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industrial activities. This made the South Boston Naval
Annex, just one mile from downtown Boston and located on prime
waterfront property, all the more attractive since the
currently underutilized land was viewed as industrial by the
neighboring South Boston community as well as by the rest of
Boston. In fact, the property was zoned for industrial use.
There were industrial facilities located on and near the
premise, and the local South Boston community supported any
prospect of jobs. Interregional expressways were easily
accessible, an important consideration for industrial
properties. Site security was relatively easy to establish.
And lastly, the site's proximity to Logan International
Airport prevented conversion to residential or recreational
uses.
Massport, EDIC, and, for a while, the BRA, all struggled
for control over the South Boston Naval Annex. Then Mayor
White forced the different agencies to compete for the right
to develop this site. Despite the interest of these public
agencies, private developers did not want to develop the site.
The world shipbuilding market was poor, the site was in poor
condition and required costly up-grading, and the price for
the property was considered too high for speculation. EDIC
saw an opportunity to create an industrial park in an area
close to the center of Boston that would otherwise remain
dormant and underutilized.
EDIC assumed control of the site from the US Navy under a
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Protection and Maintenance Agreement on September 1, 1975, and
its first tenants moved in two months later. Ultimately, EDIC
purchased approximately 100 acres for $5 to $6 million in 1977
and created the Boston Marine Industrial Park (BMIP). It had
the financial backing and general support of federal, state,
and local agencies: the U.S. Economic Development
Administration, General Services Administration, Office of
Economic Adjustment, Massachusetts' Land Bank, Mayor's Office
of Community Development, and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA).
As described in the plan for the BMIP, Boston's EDIC saw
its three main objectives as:
1. Encourage types of development, consistent with the
public interest, which will maximize employment
opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed;
2. Return to productive use those public and private land
areas and buildings which are now vacant or underutilized;
and
3. Utilize those resources within the framework of a
balanced program designed to conserve and expand existing
commerce and industry as well as create and attract new
industrial and commercial activity which will have the
greatest economic impact on the City of Boston."
As indicated here, one of the EDIC's main concerns was to
stem the flow of manufacturing jobs away from Boston by
redeveloping a blighted area and creating projects that
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ultimately involve the private sector. There were three parts
to its original plan for BMIP: the acquisition of the land,
the renovation of the existing site and buildings, and the
marketing of the site to private industry. Its goal was to
turn the site into a job-producing and self-sufficient
industrial park as soon as possible and to up-grade the
facility's infrastructure and buildings to ensure long-term
viability.
The strategy also was to lease the land rather than sell
it, in order to generate the cash flow to accomplish other
projects, much as a private developer might. Currently the
EDIC is self-sufficient, with an annual budget of
approximately $4 million and total assets of over $80 million.
The EDIC of Boston was fortunate that the Massachusetts'
Land Bank had been organized just prior to the purchase of the
Boston Naval Shipyard. With the Massachusetts Land Bank eager
to do its first project, and also in part due to the strong
financial background of Westgate, then director of the EDIC,
Boston's EDIC secured favorable terms on the mortgage: 6% for
forty years and a moratorium on the first two years payments.
This below-market rate mortgage provided the ability to start
the initial work on infrastructure and the flexibility to
locate and negotiate acceptable deals with tenants. The EDIC
of Boston was also able to obtain additional funding from the
federal government at a time when such funding was more
readily available. However, despite this relatively cheap
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money, the first mortgage payments to the Mass Land Bank were
difficult to meet.
The initial work on the infrastructure consisted of
upgrading the facility, including the utilities, piers, dry
docks, and buildings. The site conditions were generally very
poor since the Navy did little maintenance from the time it
decided to decommission the site until the time it sold the
site. The first step was to make the facility safe and
useable. This would allow the EDIC to lease space and
generate revenues which would in turn go towards more long-
term upgrading projects. The EDIC sold tax credits to obtain
the money for the improvements, spending approximately $2.5
million on repairs and upgrades. These improvements provided
enough capacity for growth and expansion of the site.
The target tenants for the space were primarily heavy
industry, particularly shipbuilding and repair, but included
sheet metal work, food product machinery, warehousing and
wholesaling, and light manufacturing (such as the garment
industry, typesetting,. and publishing and printing). The EDIC
also considered secondary office space to complement and
service the primary industrial uses and because this provides
more jobs per square foot than industrial uses.
To locate these tenants, the EDIC began a recruiting
program, with efforts in the Boston, regional, and national
markets. Most of the sales and marketing was done via cold
calls. It recruited heavily from other parts of Boston to
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stop firms from leaving the area. Areas of controversy and
areas where rehabilitation and commercial speculation would
drive rents too high for industrial use were specific targets
of the recruitment.
The lease was structured to promote employment of Boston
residents, women, and various ethnic groups. The more Boston
residents employed by a firm, the better its lease. According
to the leasing agent for the EDIC, rents are now at or below
comparable rents in the area, and the services and costs per
square foot are what attract the tenants to the site. Tenants
leave because of either expansion or financial difficulties.
Neither the lease structure of the recruitment practices have
substantially changed over the years.
Most of the BMIP space is currently leased by marine
related or industrial firms. Unfortunately, the largest dry
dock on the site has not been used successfully. The original
plan was to model it after the successful public dry dock, in
Portland, Oregon, which is rented on a gross ton per day, on
a first serve basis. This has not worked well in Boston, and
every year for the past four the director of the EDIC has
seriously considered closing it. There is much opposition to
the closing of the dry dock and, as of yet, no other use for
the dry dock has been found.
Including the Boston Design Center as a tenant in BMIP was
controversial. The Design Center does not fit directly into
industrial or marine-related categories, it does not provide
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blue-collar jobs, nor does it offer services to the primary
industry on the site. The Design Center is a collection of
showrooms for interior furnishings; they were included in the
industrial park because they were forced out of their space
due to rent increases caused by commercial speculation. The
Design Center needed space and might have moved out of Boston
had they not located at BMIP. The Design Center leases
approximately one third of the 1,651,200 square foot Army Base
building. (In 1983 the EDIC purchased the Army Base adjacent
to the Boston Naval Shipyard, effectively doubling the square
footage.) Its rent covers much of the cost of protecting and
maintaining the site and provides jobs, even if not blue-
collar positions. It also has provided attractive public
spaces, improving the image of the industrial park.
Including the Design Center, really more service than
industrial related, is a good indication of the changes taking
place in the macroeconomy and in Boston. In the Boston Globe
(April 29, 1986) an article on the Design Center referred to
it as a "metaphor for the change that has occurred generally
in the past generation, from an industrial city to a city of
services - from a city of gritty production to one of
glittering consumption." Even in a place that is trying to
mitigate the damage of the changes in the macroeconomy, facing
change can not be stopped.
Other EDIC projects include Alsen-Mapes in Dorchester
(1976) and the Crosstown Industrial Park in Roxbury (including
Digital Equipment Corporation, 1978). Currently they are
working on two projects with the MBTA: Jackson Square and the
old Car Barn site in East Boston. The Newmarket Industrial
District Plan is on hold due to the inability of obtaining
funding from the State. This "mega-master plan" did not
receive financing because of political reasons and the state's
fiscal crisis.
Structure and Programs
Besides these development projects, Boston's EDIC has a
brokerage arm which identifies available space for prospective
businesses. It also gives technical and financial advice to
many businesses, which includes supporting the Boston Local
Development Corporation (BLDC) and the Boston Industrial
Development Financing Authority (BIDFA). Both BLDC and BIDFA
are legally separate entities with separate boards. BLDC does
financing for small businesses, particularly Small Business
Administration loans (501C). BIDFA issues industrial
development bonds.
The EDIC started a job training program in 1977, originally
providing training in the heavy trades, such as welding and
pile-driving. This was a critical need because those jobs
tended to be filled by non-Boston residents. The Boston
Technical Center is now a separate organization in order to
take advantage of Pell Grants. Also, it has adapted its
training program to the changing needs of the community and
work place.
In order to strengthen Boston's industrial base, other
programs were initiated through the years including: (1) a
Trade Mission to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea for Boston
firms funded by a grant from the U.S. Economic Development
Administration, (2) a "Buy Boston" campaign, organized in the
late 1970s, urging Boston companies to buy from each other and
for the City's Purchasing Agent to exercise a preference in
buying from Boston firms, and (3) an export assistance
program. These were all part of a general strategy of
bringing new life to Boston's industrial base.
The EDIC of Boston uses the BMIP as the cornerstone of its
strategy. Revenues from these long-term leases finance the
agency's overhead and staff, as well as other projects. This
strategy also ensures the land is preserved for industrial
purposes. The EDIC does not plan to sell the land, although
it is considering joint partnerships with private developers
for the remaining projects on the site and has sold at least
some of the sites located in its other industrial parks.
Over time the Boston EDIC has expanded its vision to
include attacking the negative smokestack image of industry.
By establishing an attractive and inviting environment in its
industrial parks, Boston residents will develop a positive
image of the industrial parks and industry will be attracted
to Boston. The BMIP is to be a model of this and originally
design guidelines were to be developed to achieve this. Due
to budget cuts these guidelines have never been completed.
The inclusion of the Harborwalk in BMIP is part of this
image-building and portions of the Harborwalk are already in
place. There are also public spaces at the Design Center and
improved and landscaped roads and sidewalks. Both of these
have made a marked improvement in the appeal of the public
areas. In fact, in the past year, BMIP has won three awards
for design.
Although the Boston EDIC has become a much more
"enlightened" organization by expanding its vision of how to
achieve its goal by making industrial parks more appealing,
it has become much less of a risk taker. Where once its board
really pushed it for results, the current board is much more
cautious, especially on its approach to financial management.
Over the years, the board has changed and the EDIC has
gotten much larger and bureaucratic. As the organization
grew, more controls, such as accounting and personnel systems,
systemized leasing, and audited reports, were instituted for
accountability purposes. Now there are more- barriers and
decision points to pass to initiate a project. It is
especially difficult to be innovative since the real estate
slow down has caused them to cut back many programs including
much of their research and development and their program to
develop industrial park design guidelines.
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Creation
The economic conditions facing Lynn in the mid to late
1970s were similar to Boston's--fairly bleak. Although
General Electric, the largest employer in Lynn since 1935,
employed nearly 14,000 in 1977 and paid very well, there was
little left of the industrial base of what was once considered
an industrial city. The shoe factories, which had been strong
in Lynn, had dwindled due to modern manufacturing techniques
and relocated either south or to international shores.
Concurrently, as Lynn's industrial sector deteriorated, its
younger population left. Consequently, more households met
HUD's very low income standards. This trend precipitated a
higher demand in services from the city at the same time the
tax base of the city was shrinking.
Part of Lynn's economic development strategies stemmed from
the problem caused by its dependence on the manufacturing
sector, especially the shoe industry. Due to a decline of 15%
in the manufacturing sector from 1974 to 1982 and an increase
in the service sector of 21% in the same time span, many
displaced manufacturing workers were employed in the service
sector." And, although the service sector was growing, there
were fewer service jobs available in absolute numbers than
there were displaced manufacturing workers. The unemployment
rate of nearly 9% in 1981 reflected this problem.
Lynn's strategy was to create and retain jobs by broadening
the tax base and encouraging local business expansion,
diversifying the economic base of the city, fostering new and
small industrial businesses, and boosting the image of the
city. An Industrial Development Commission (IDC) was formed,
but the group had no power, authority, or budget. Bob Baker
was the Executive Director of the IDC. In order to get the
power and authority to act aggressively, an EDIC was created
in 1978, modeled after the one in Boston. The EDIC was formed
in response to this need for an organization with capabilities
and skills in real estate development and also to attract
federal money for economic development projects.
At the time there was a specific project, an 85-acre
waterfront site owned by Massachusetts Electric and Boston
Gas, which Lynn wanted to develop for marine related
waterfront uses for economic development purposes. An EDIC
was needed for this project, called the America East Project,
because it would have eminent domain powers. Lynn had no
urban renewal authority with these powers, nor could the City
use its eminent domain powers for economic development
purposes where the land taken was to be used for private
purposes.
The America East project was never completed due to
problems in land procurement, mainly environmental. Although
the project failed, the EDIC was formed and remained a viable
agency. As for Boston, Lynn's EDIC was created through a
special act in the Legislature (Chapter 1140 of 1978) with the
EOCD helping to draft and approve the legislation.
Structure and Projects
The EDIC is part of Lynn's Office of Economic Development
(LOED) and is funded like any other city agency. There are
currently three full-time staff members whose salaries and
operating expenses are paid by the city. These include the
Executive Director, Deputy Director, and Administrative
Assistant. There are also five people on contract to the
EDIC, funded by previous projects. It also uses money
received from UDAG and other grants (CDAGs, PWEDs, the state
Coastal Facilities Improvement Programi along with some
private investment). Its total budget is approximately
$750,000 and it has $9 million in assets.
Unlike Boston, Lynn's EDIC is not totally self-supporting
from its projects, but receives $131,000 per year from the
city towards its operating budget to supplement the rest it
obtain from the EDIC operations. These EDIC funds from
operations, like Boston, are generated primarily from leases
rather than from selling the land. Unlike Boston however, it
rarely manages its property, preferring to have a private
operating company or developer manage them. In one case at
least, this may be because the project is not industrial in
nature.
There are three other economic development/financing
organizations also under LOED which interact with the EDIC.
They were all started about the same time. This was done to
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offer as many services to the business community as possible,
while efficiently using their resources by sharing staff and
space. Because of this, it is difficult to distinguish the
lines between the organizations.
The Lynn Capital Investment Corporation (LCIC) is for Small
Business Administration (SBA) loans and its work is fed by the
staff of the EDIC. It is made up of 11 board members and
approves loans recommended by the EDIC. The Lynn Municipal
Finance Corporation (LMFC) is made up of a board that makes
small loans to the business community. Formerly it was
staffed with two loan officers, but only one remains. LMFC
has a revolving loan fund of approximately $900,000 from a
block grant. It also provide technical assistance in
financial plans and recommends small businesses to banks. The
Lynn Industrial Finance Authority (LIFA) can issue industrial
bonds. Currently it is not very active, primarily due to the
1986 Tax Act which cut back eligible private-purpose
activities that could be funded by tax-exempt bonds. Earlier,
these bonds were conpidered a good deal for capital for
expansion by providing money which was offered at a lower rate
because lenders were not taxed on the interest payments they
received from the bonds. The Lynn EDIC also has bonding
powers, but has never floated a bond. Supposedly this was due
to political reasons.
Of all the organizations under the LOED, the EDIC is the
largest and generates the most cash, with specific powers to
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make loans, lease space, and use eminent domain in the
appropriate circumstances. The Lynn EDIC did not restrict
itself to industrial sites. It also pursued economic
development projects which indirectly affect industrial
development. In particular, it acquired the land by eminent
domain for Heritage Park and transferred it to the state
(Department of Environmental Management). This park was part
of a state program aimed at developing recreational parks
which would act as catalysts for economic development,
targeting commercial and residential, but not industrial
markets.
Another example of the liberal interpretation of the
legislation is the 412 units of affordable housing that the
EDIC owns. Actually, it owns the land and the shell of the
building, but did not develop or manage it. Originally it
planned the site to be mixed use, including light
manufacturing, but that did not work out. The EDIC decided
it was economically best to use the site, with a grant from
UDAG for economic development, for affordable housing and
lease the site to a developer.
The EDIC also owns, but does not manage, an incubator
building. The 120,000 square foot J.B. Blood Building is
primarily for small and start-up businesses. The EDIC used
private financing to purchase the building and some state
grants to refurbish it. Like the 412 residential units, it
owns but does not manage the building. The purpose of this
incubator building is to nurture small industrial businesses
to alleviate economic and physical distress in the community.
The total development cost of the building was $1,716,500, of
which $734,000 was for the building and site. Funding was
obtained through public and private sources. Many of the
original tenants were obtained from those displaced by a 1981
fire that destroyed many of the city's downtown mill
buildings.
The EDIC also has the Waterfront Industrial Park,
Commercial Pier, and Marshall Wharf II. Commercial Pier is
on the waterfront, off the Lynnway, and is geared to
lobstermen, but not for tourists. It is the only one of the
EDIC projects that the EDIC manages. Marshall Wharf II has
140,000 square feet of industrial space built with the
insurance proceeds from the 1981 fire that destroyed the
Marshall Wharf I project.
There is no existing vacant land that can be used for
future projects in Lynn at this time. Lynn has always lacked
adequate space for industrial development and has had to use
eminent domain to obtain land three times--for the America
East Project, the Lynnway Waterfront Industrial Park (land
owned by Massachusetts Electric), and the Heritage State Park.
These takings have not been friendly and have resulted in
numerous law suits.
Programs
Lynn's EDIC's goals have not changed, but their strategy
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has. In particular, due to the set of circumstances they
faced and choose to pursue, they have focused on a broadened
vision of the legislation to achieve the goal, doing less and
less industrial development.
The goal, to attract and retain business, continues to be
difficult, especially with no land available for industrial
development. Road access is poor and although Lynn does have
commuter rail, there isn't MBTA access. According to Peter
DeVeau, Deputy Director of Lynn EDIC, the EDIC is most
effective with large projects, fifteen acres or larger, but
there are currently none around. It is spending
proportionately less time on actual industrial development
projects, and more on its affiliates, particularly LCIC and
LMFC. Ex-Director Baker indicated that even when the EDIC was
first created a main focus was to nurture its base and to
facilitate expansion by offering access to affordable capital.
Three examples of this strategy are West Lynn Creamery,
Harvard Box, and U.S. Plastics. Therefore, its impact on jobs
and tax base comes, not. directly from jobs created or retained
in projects it develops, but from businesses it is helping
with technical and financial support.
This may change with Norelco, one of the five top employers
in Lynn, closing its facility and General Electric cutting
back at its. This may open up land for industrial development
and, with the loss of so many jobs, the impetus to do so.
Obtaining the funds from a private lending institution will
require careful planning and research.
Wareham
Creation
Wareham is a much smaller community than either Boston or
Lynn, with a population of approximately 18,000 in the 1980
census (versus 563,000 for Boston and 74,000 for Lynn).
Wareham, historically one of Massachusetts poorest cities or
towns only behind Boston, Chelsea, and Gay Head"3 , has
chronically had high unemployment. According to Constantine
Yankopoulos, Chairman of Wareham's Community Development
Authority and Department (CDA & CDD) and Director of Wareham's
EDIC, Wareham has had a long history of economic development
originating in the early 1970s. Its focus from the beginning
was on job creation and increasing tax base. To this end, the
town focused on industrial development rather than encouraging
residential development, the backbone of neighboring Cape
Cod's economic development.
Wareham's EDIC was established through Chapter 121C of the
General Laws in 1972. Originally there was a lack of
direction, with no staff and no one to follow through on the
actions or recommendations of the board. In 1975 the EDIC
Board obtained funds from the town ($10,000) and matched by
the EOCD ($10,000), using them to hire a full-time person with
expertise and direction to pursue federal and state grants.
Soon thereafter the economic development director obtained
funds to buy 60 acres of land for an industrial park. The
58
town spent $400,000 for the land, and another $400,000 for
infrastructure improvements came from the federal government.
Projects
The EDIC was desperate to get businesses in the park, so it
took a calculated risk to attract industry to this unproven
market by conveying the first six-acre parcel for one dollar.
A fifteen-year restriction was placed on the deed that
recently has come into play. The EDIC used the deed
restriction to leverage a $15,000 contribution for the
relocation and upgrading of the Wareham Child Care Center
located in the industrial park. Now all but one of the sites
have been sold off.
Wareham EDIC has since bought a near-by 70 acres for
$100,000 for phase two. The price was very low since this was
a bank foreclosure. Of the $100,000 sales price, the state
paid for 30%. The necessary access road was developed with
a Public Works Economic Development (PWED) Grant. Currently,
the Director is considering selling part of this site to the
CDA for affordable housing development due its location
adjacent to a residential area. This would be consistent with
this Director's desire to have a more balanced economic
development strategy, including residential growth. (This
strategy is not necessarily shared by others in Wareham.)
The decision to sell the sites in the industrial park,
rather than lease them, is very different than the strategy
followed by the Boston or Lynn EDICs. According to
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Yankopoulos, Wareham chose this route because it felt that the
market in its area was not strong enough for industrial land
leases, particularly since businesses wanting to move to that
area wanted to own their own building and land. The Wareham
CDD, the operating arm of the EDIC and CDA, maintains tight
control over who it sells the sites to and also has developed
a set of covenants governing the type of growth and
environment of the industrial parks.
In particular, the EDIC has targeted light manufacturing
for their Phase I Industrial Park. The Phase II Industrial
Park can not handle as intense development due to the
insufficient infrastructure, so the EDIC is promoting
warehouse and distribution in this industrial park. Wareham
EDIC has been criticized for not attracting large employers
like Digital in Boston's Crosstown Industrial Park or high-
tech firms. However, these firms would not necessarily find
Wareham attractive, mainly due to the lack of availability of
large numbers of highly educated, high-tech workers locally.
The land in the industrial park is kept at affordable prices,
competitive in the marketplace. This does pose problems for
future development, since when it sells off all of its land
it will potentially go out of business. This is especially
problematic since obtaining funds for future acquisitions is
becoming more difficult. Of course, once the goal is
accomplished, why continue?
This strategy, to sell the land versus lease, is very
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important to the EDIC's future since the EDIC bankrolls all
of the CDA's operations including salaries. The CDA was
established in 1977 by a town so strongly committed to
economic development it adopted all organizational structures
that existed for economic development. Although there are
many overlapping functions and powers in their charters, there
are enough differences in the direction and specific goals
that allow room for both organizations.
Back in 1980, when Proposition 2 1/2 came into existence,
Wareham needed to cut its budget. Prior to that, the town had
an opportunity to buy a defunct golf course (bankrupt and
owing taxes). The town thought this would be an ideal site
for an inn/conference center. It hoped this would increase
its tourist economic base, since there was no real hotel in
Wareham and its tourism consisted only of day-trippers. The
town's leadership thought this would be more advantageous than
a residential development proposed by private developers.
The golf course was maintained with CETA (Comprehensive
Employment Training Act) employees.
When Proposition 2 1/2 came into effect Wareham's
leadership saw this as a chance to get the golf course off the
town tax roll by giving the golf course to the EDIC. The golf
course and the sales of the industrial park land would give
the EDIC the ability to fund the CDA. Other sources of funds
for the CDA include state and federal grants, bank loans,
industrial loan repayments, and housing rehab loan repayments.
The EDIC's sources of funds are state and federal grants, sale
of land at the industrial parks and bank loans.
The golf course has since been sold to a private owner with
provisions to keep the golf course public. The inn/conference
center is planned for a 1991 construction start. To date, a
new $1.2 million club house was built, as well as luxury
condominiums. Also, since the golf course was sold, over
$750,000 has been put into renovating it, something the town
could do on its own with or without the EDIC and CDA.
Structure
The EDIC has no staff and depends upon the Community
Development Department (CDD) for all actions and
implementations. The CDA and CDD were created under
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 270 in 1977. The CDA is
an operating agency and an urban renewal agency within the
meaning of Chapter 121B of the General Laws. It is controlled
by a three-member board, two appointed by the selectmen and
one appointed by the EOCD. The Director of the CDA also
serves as chairman.
Two board members on the CDA are also on the EDIC board,
and the director of the CDA serves as the director of the
EDIC. The director of the EDIC only provides services to the
EDIC and is not on the board of the EDIC, although he does
control the financial operations.
The CDD, the operating arm for the CDA and the EDIC, has
four staff including the Director, an Assistant Director, a
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Fiscal Manager, and an Office Manager. In total, they spend
the equivalent of one and one-half full-time employees on EDIC
tasks. Because of the relationship of the director of the CDA
to the EDIC and the CDD, the State Ethics Commission required
that the Director be appointed as a "Special Employee" in
order to avoid any violation of the conflict of interest laws.
Wareham also had a Wareham Development Corporation (WDC),
created under Chapter 180 of the General Laws, which was
started following the Small Business Administration 502
program guidelines. It was a non-profit local development
organization, capitalized by grants from the CDA. The board
of directors was the same as the EDIC, but as the EDIC board
is appointed by the town selectmen and the elected terms
between the two organizations differed, the membership has
diversified. The WDC was recently dissolved and the assets
recaptured by the CDA. The Wareham Industrial Development
Authority was also disbanded because it was viewed as
redundant to Massachusetts Industrial Finance Authority and
had been inactive.
One of the objectives of the EDIC and CDA is to keep the
economic development decisions as separate from the political
arena as possible. They strongly feel the importance of
maintaining confidentiality in business deals, and therefore
positioning the EDIC in a non-political environment. They
want to see decisions made outside the political context, and
made for purely business/economic development reasons. Their
weekly meetings where decisions, plans, and strategy are made
have managed to remain business oriented. However, the
economic development plan still must pass before the town
selectmen, which is very political process. Once it has
passed the CDD is free to implement the plan without further
review.
SUMMARY
Boston was the first EDIC in Massachusetts, upon which all
others in the state were modeled. The Boston EDIC is the
biggest and most complex, with the widest range of services.
Lynn's EDIC uses the most liberal interpretation of the
legislation, as indicated by the projects it has chosen to
pursue. Wareham is the smallest of the three and the most
rural. Also, where Boston and Lynn are trying to retain and
expand their industrial bases, Wareham is trying to create an
industrial base from scratch.
Boston is the largest of the three municipalities, and the
size of its EDIC reflects this. The Boston EDIC has ninety-
seven full-time employees, one hundred and eight total and an
operating budget of close to $4 million. Its assets are $39.1
million, not including the buildings. A value of $80+ million
would more properly reflect the total assets. Lynn has three
full-time employees and five on contract. Its operating
budget is approximately $750,000, of which $131,000 is from
the city; its assets are $9 million. The percent of time
Wareham's four CDD employees, including the director, spend
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on EDIC tasks is equivalent to one and one-half full-time
employees. The director spends 50% of his time on EDIC work
and 50% on CDA work. Wareham's EDIC budget is $571,563 and
its assets are approximately $2.6 million. (See Table 1)
TABLE 1
Comparison of Environmental Factors
Boston Lynn Wareham
Size':
1980 population 562,994 78,741 18,457
Area in square miles 45.40 11.21 38.03
Location:
Transportation access good poor fair
Miles from Boston CBD 0 15 55
Land availability fair poor fair
EDIC Legislation Special Special 121C
Existing Industrial Base yes yes no
Year started:
Board 1971 1978 1972
First director 1975 1978 1976
EDIC:
# full-time employees 97 8 1.5
Budget $3,890,784 $750,000 $571,563
Assets $80 million $9 mil $2.5 mil
Source: Massachusetts Municipal Profiles 1989-1990
In terms of market area, which is centered at the Boston
central business district (CBD), Wareham is the furthest away
at a fifty-five-mile distance. However, Lynn has more
transportation problems than Wareham or Boston since it is not
located on a major highway. Also, Lynn has the least amount
of land currently available for industrial development.
Boston was the original EDIC in the state, but did not
develop its first property until four years after it was
created. Similarly, Wareham's first funding came in 1976,
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four years after the EDIC was created. As mentioned earlier,
Wareham used $10,000 from the town budget and $10,000 from the
EOCD to bire a director, who promptly obtained funding for
Wareham's first industrial park. Just a year later, Lynn
appropriated twice that amount, $40,000, for its first year
of operation. Lynn hired a director when it created the EDIC,
and a project existed when the EDIC was created. Neither
Boston's nor Wareham's EDICs were created in conjunction with
a specific project; however, neither accomplished any of the
goals until they did start one.
Wareham was the only one of the three case studies to be
created under 121C legislation. This does not influence the
EDIC greatly. For instance, special legislation, as was the
case for Boston's and Lynn's EDIC, does not require EOCD
approval for plans as does 121C; however, the EOCD has not
interfered with any of Wareham's plans. Nor has it stopped
Wareham's EDIC from taking control of a golf course, something
definitely not industrial in nature, and selling it off for
economic development purposes. The only constraint special
legislation has posed on Wareham has been the inability to
float bonds due to a flaw in the legislation.
EDICs were chosen as the economic development organization
in each of these cases because of its specific powers.
Although all three EDICs have the same set of tools and powers
at their disposal, they have not all used them to the same
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degree. (See Table 2) The reasons why these differences exist
are examined in the next chapter.
TABLE 2
Tools used by the EDIC
Boston Lynn Wareham
Economic development plan yes yes yes
Land assembly yes yes yes
Eminent domain yes yes yes
Infrastructure improvements yes yes yes
Construct and improve
facilities yes yes no
Develop and dispose of
properties yes yes yes
Primarily lease or sell lease lease sell
Finance:
Bond yes no no
Grants yes yes yes
Borrow yes yes yes
Manage projects yes yes no
Marketing yes yes yes
Other:
Technical assistance yes yes no
Job training yes no no
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter will identify the important
factors in an implementation strategy that make an EDIC
effective. These include identifying: (1) the environmental
factors, including the constraints and initial resources that
will affect the outcome, (2) the tools embodied in the
legislation that can be used effective, y to achieve the
desired goal, and (3) the organizational factors. The success
of the three EDICs is examined prior to the analysis.
Effectiveness
Each of the three communities outlined in the case studies
has had some measure of success in implementation since they
attained the desired objective. Although none of the EDICs
examined set specific levels to attain or a time frame to
achieve the goals in, they all created jobs, maintained or
increased the tax base, and improved blighted areas. Pressman
and Wildavsky define successful implementation as generally
serving the purpose of the goal if not the exact letter of the
instructions. 9 Each of the EDICs had some program or project
that was only marginally related to industrial development for
achieving the goals. However, as noted, these other programs
did create or retain jobs, increase the tax base, and improve
blighted areas, so they did fit the agencies' mandate. This
definition best matches the interviewed directors' definitions
of success. As a measure of effectiveness, Boston claims the
retention or addition of over 4000 jobs, Lynn 1100 jobs, and





Jobs created 4000+ 1000+ 600
Increase in tax base:
Dollars N/A N/A $11,800,000
Percent N/A N/A 2,500%
Physical revitalization yes yes yes
Source of Boston figures: Marilyn Swartz Lloyd 1990; Lynn
figures: Lynn Office of Economic Development Report 1990;
Wareham figures: C. Yankopoulos interview 1990.
Comparing the level of effectiveness of the three cases
creates many problems as pointed out in the Introduction. For
instance, have jobs just moved from one area of town to
another? Would these jobs have been created with or without
the EDIC? Are these the direct jobs that have resulted from
the development of the industrial park or are secondary jobs
included in the numbers? What type of jobs are these? Are
they high-quality jobs or low-quality jobs?
To try to keep the numbers comparable, only jobs connected
to projects were included in the "jobs created" line in
Table 3. The Wareham numbers are only for one project and do
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not include any of its other programs or any other
manufacturing jobs that may have been stimulated by the Phase
I Industrial Park. The Boston numbers include its three
industrial parks, but not any attributable from its programs.
Lynn's numbers are from the J.B. Blood Building, Waterfront
Industrial Park, and construction of the city's first
commercial fishing pier.
Only Wareham attempted to quantify the tax base
improvement, the other two EDICs felt it was too hard to
calculate the impact of their programs on the tax base. In
Wareham's case there was no industrial base initially, which
accounts for such a large percent increase, so calculating the
change due to their efforts was fairly straight forward.
The physical revitalization in Boston covered 200 acres
which was composed of the three industrial parks. Boston has
won three design awards for its efforts. Lynn's physical
revitalization includes four projects. Wareham has developed
one industrial park and is in the process of a second.
However, its industrial parks are on virgin land, not in what
was once blighted areas.
Environmental Factors
As mentioned earlier, implementation is affected by
intrinsic qualities and external conditions. Each of these
three case studies has a unique set of starting conditions and
resources. These differences, which impact implementation,
include the size of the city, location, historical context,
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and other resources and capacities.
The size of the city is an important differentiating
element because it affects the budget available, the pool of
talent for the staff, and the need and scope of services
required. The more a city has to invest, and if it does so
wisely, the more it can expect in return. A larger city
generally has more to spend in absolute dollars; it is also
more likely to have more sophisticated constituents and staff
and more complicated needs. For these reasons, the size of
a city impacts the strategy choice an EDIC makes to accomplish
its objectives.
EDIC funding influences the staff budget, both as to the
number and their respective qualifications. The difference
in the initial ability to fund the EDIC also affects its
growth and the type of projects it is able to undertake.
There is a minimum level of cost that all EDICs must meet.
As mentioned, staffing is constrained by the pool of
applicants and the budget, and is affected by the size of the
city. Wareham has experienced staff in economic development,
but feels that the political powers and the citizens of the
town are not as sophisticated. This means they must spend
extra time educating the public on the current economic
development issues. Wareham has difficulty finding student
interns for small projects because the town is so far from the
majority of the college and university campuses in the Boston
metropolitan region. They also have a lower pay scale than
Boston. Boston has a large, talented pool of applicants for
staff EDIC jobs. Generally Boston has more qualified
applicants than open positions. Boston's size provides the
resources--intellectual, social, political, and business--
that its EDIC can call upon when necessary.
The size of the city also affects the organizational
structure. Whereas Boston's EDIC is totally separate from the
other economic development organizations in Boston, both
Lynn's and Wareham's EDICs are integrated with their economic
development departments. Boston's size requires many
different agencies to handle all the services, and each agency
is independent, although they do cooperate. Therefore, Boston
must interact with many more parties to accomplish its goals,
often complicating the process. Wareham and Lynn can not
afford another agency or more staff. Wareham and Lynn must
make efficient use of existing staff by having them perform
a number of tasks for various organizations. Therefore, their
hiring strategy will be different than Boston's.
Location is a major. constraint on industrial development
and there are some important differences in the three case
studied. The differences in location between the three case
studies is a major determining factor for what type of firms
the respective municipalities should target for their
industrial parks and their various programs. This shapes
their strategy.
Boston is the hub, the center of the metropolitan market
area. Firms locating here will be close to their customers
and suppliers. Access to transportation, ie. highway, rail
and waterway, is already present, although there are areas
within the city that have some accessibility and traffic
problems. Lynn, closer to Boston than Wareham, has the
poorest transportation access, with the main highway, 1-95,
approximately ten miles away. Nor does Lynn have access to
a MBTA line, but there are the Commuter Rail and even rail
spurs for other industrial sites.
Wareham is the most rural of the three locations and is the
farthest from the metropolitan market area. Wareham is near
the edge of the seventy-mile radius of the Boston metropolitan
market area. As mentioned earlier, distance from the market
area is a factor in firms' locational decisions, with most
firms wanting to locate within a seventy-mile radius of their
market area. Wareham is at the intersection of two main
highways, 1-195 and 1-495, and though fifty-five miles from
Boston, it is an easy one and a quarter hour drive.
Location is also an important consideration for industrial
firms because it determines the supply of qualified workers.
High-tech firms willing to locate in Boston would not consider
Wareham due to the lack of qualified high-tech workers in the
area.
Another element of location which impacts the industrial
market is whether the space can be rented or sold. Wareham
must approach the industrial parks it develop in a much
different vein than Boston or Lynn. Wareham is less able to
lease space and use the cash flow to cover overhead costs.
Instead, it must sell the lots and use the money both to pay
the overhead of the CDD, CDA, and EDIC, and to help finance
any other operations or projects. This obviously impacts its
ability for long-term implementation of strategy and for
accomplishment of goals. Since there is little extra money
to finance other projects, eventually, when all the lots are
sold, the EDIC will close. Even now it cannot locate funds
to provide a second and necessary road for the Phase II
Industrial Park. Boston, and Lynn to a lesser extent,
currently has a solid cash flow, which allows the agency to
grow and to leverage other projects. This provides the
ability to be more forward thinking.
A critical decision criterion for firms considering
relocation is access. However, access has multiple components
for cities: (1) location near the firm's market, suppliers and
labor force, as just described; (2) access of the workers to
jobs; and (3) access to, financial and technical information.
Boston is the only one of the three agencies which actively
addresses the second component. While none of the three case
studies provides transportation to jobs outside its area,
Boston does provide a job training program to ensure that its
workers have the proper skills for the firms in the area.
Boston began the job training program when a Revere man was
pictured in the Boston Globe repairing ships at BMIP. The
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EDIC was criticized for not finding a Boston resident with
that skill for the job (or for the picture). In its search
to find out why there was not a Boston resident pictured, the
need for job training became apparent.
All three EDICs are involved in providing firms access to
financial and technical help. Often this financial help comes
through the support of a subsidiary organization, such as an
IDFA, rather than directly from the EDIC.
Historically, Wareham has the smallest industrial base and
is actually trying to establish a base to help raise the
income level of the town. Whereas it is trying to ensure that
firms locate in Wareham versus other towns in the region and
therefore market themselves on a regional level, Boston is
trying to stem the flow of manufacturing firms out of the city
to the suburbs and to other regions of the United States and
foreign countries. Boston considers more macroeconomic issues
when planning its strategy as indicated by its export program
and Trade Mission to Asia. Boston's competition for firms are
other major metropolitan areas, foreign as well as national,
and the cities and towns of the region. It is affected
directly by macroeconomic trends that change the conditions
for a firm doing business in one region or another. Due to
their size, Wareham and Lynn do not impact other metropolitan
areas in the way Boston does. While the macro economic trends
affect them, they are still competing with their region's
towns and cities for their share. In addition, Wareham and
Lynn do not have the budget to do much national, let alone
international recruitment of industry.
One of Boston's main concerns is that office space is
taking over space originally occupied by industrial firms,
driving rents higher than the industrial sector is willing to
pay. Therefore, its strategy addresses this issue directly.
In particular, the firms recruited to its industrial parks
are from these areas. In fact, Boston even leased space to
the Design Center because it was being forced out of its space
due to increased rents from office space speculation.
Like Boston, Lynn is trying to retain its industrial base
which it is losing due to technological changes and movement
of firms to areas with lower manufacturing and labor costs.
Its strategy is to supply cheap capital (long-term and tax-
exempt), by supporting the other agencies within the LOED, to
nurture local firms and help them expand. West Lynn Creamery
is one of its success stories. At the same time it wants to
nurture its existing businesses, it also wants to diversify
its industrial base so. Lynn is not too dependent on any one
industry.
As has been shown, these differences lead the EDICs to
different strategies to obtain their goal of creating and
retaining jobs and broadening the tax base. In particular,
Boston has been much more active in developing projects such
as its export assistance program and job training program.
Boston still has a relatively stable economy despite the
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decreasing number of manufacturing firms because it has such
a strong office market. This strong office market implies
that increasing the tax base is not as important as job
retention and creation. Because Boston has one of the lowest
income per family levels in the state, its goal is to create
as many high-quality jobs for its constituents as possible.
Lynn and Wareham do not have a replacement for loss or lack
of an industrial base. Therefore, both have a strong need to
broaden the tax base, as well as create and retain jobs for
their constituents. This is exemplified in Lynn's case where
a diminishing tax base and increasing need for services makes
an increased tax base that much more important to its economic
viability. Because of this issue, Boston will spend more on
a job training program than either Lynn or Wareham. Although
Lynn and Wareham want their workers to have access to jobs,
they also would rather spend their limited resources on
projects that both increase jobs and the tax base. A job
training program does nothing to increase the tax base.
Having land as a resource, that can be developed, is
another important differentiating character between the three
cases. While Boston was hurt by the closing of the South
Boston Naval Annex, the Boston Army Base, and the Charlestown
Navy Shipyard, these sites have given Boston a golden
opportunity for redevelopment and at relatively reasonable
prices. These sites offer plenty of space without the need
for the use of eminent domain; also, they are industrial in
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nature and do not require rezoning, and therefore are unlikely
to encounter much public opposition. In addition, much of the
infrastructure necessary for industrial use, such as rail
spurs, cranes, and dry docks is in place. Much of this land
has unique properties, such as the BMIP with its waterfront
location and dry docks. Boston's strategy reflects the use
of this resource by the amount of effort and funds spent on
developing BMIP. It is also reflected in Boston's EDIC's
reliance on BMIP for the majority of its cash flow.
Not only has Boston had the advantage of obtaining land
from closed military sites, but it has also been working with
the MBTA to develop parcels of land. The MBTA has land it
does not need and must either sell it to the highest bidder,
which is often unacceptable to the neighboring community, or
transfer it to another public agency. These sites open up new
possibilities for industrial development in a time when land
is becoming prohibitively expensive for the EDICs to purchase.
Lynn lacks this resource of land. It has had much more
difficulty putting together parcels of land for industrial
development. Thus shortage of industrial land may change with
Norelco closing its Lynn facility and GE cutting back at its.
However, this land, being privately owned and coming after the
Boston metropolitan area real estate boom, may be much more
expensive for Lynn to purchase than was the South Boston Naval
Annex and Boston Army Base for Boston, or even relatively more
than the foreclosed property that Wareham bought for its Phase
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II Industrial Park. Lynn's strategy to rely more on working
with its LOED counterparts than developing industrial land is
a by-product of this lack of developable land.
Currently, Wareham is finishing the development of their
first industrial park and proceeding on their second.
However, there is little space remaining zoned for industrial
because much of the town had been previously zoned and
developed as residential. What land it does use is virgin
land, never developed before, which is unlike Boston and Lynn.
Its strategy is to establish an industrial base, and therefore
its energies are spent towards marketing Wareham to industrial
firms and developing the two industrial parks.
Another element of the respective EDIC strategies is their
stage of growth. In turn, this has been determined by their
past strategy of investment of their resources. Both Lynn and
Wareham are not at as advanced a stage of growth as Boston,
as indicated by their concern over their cash flow. In
particular, they have more concern over whether they will have
the revenues necessarysto continue covering their costs. For
instance, Lynn has five staff members on contract, paid from
EDIC project cash flows, they are not permanent staff. It is
important to note that both Wareham and Lynn have been
successful at covering their costs for at least ten years.
Another indication of their stage of growth is that both are
still small, simple organizations.
Boston's later stage of growth is indicated by its much
larger organization and use of functional managers that handle
many of the duties performed by the directors of the other two
EDICs. Boston has evolved over time into an organization
which is much more complex and intricate. When Marilyn Swartz
Lloyd became director in 1984, Boston's EDIC was evolving from
an entrepreneurial stage where month-to-month survival was the
important concern, to one where financial and operational
controls and management were becoming necessary for continued
growth.
Also during her tenure the EDIC enlarged its vision for its
industrial parks to address the aesthetic and physical impacts
of an industrial area on a community. This is something
neither of the other two EDICs have considered doing, even as
a solution to a negative image problem.
Boston is also, if not the most broad, one of the most
broad Industrial Development Corporations in the country in
terms of the number and scope of subsidiary organizations and
departments it has. As mentioned earlier, it has many
organizations under its auspices, all of which have their own
boards, and the EDIC itself is a totally separate
organization. One of the organizations under the EDIC is the
Boston Training Center. A job training program is not
included in any other EDIC and it is questionable whether it
related to the EDIC mandate of industrial development.
Regularly the directors of the Boston EDIC have gotten
questioned over the years by their board as to why a job
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training program should be run by a development organization.
However, the job training program is a very visible and
important part of Boston's strategy. Not only is it a selling
tool used to attract firms by helping them find skilled
workers locally, but it gives the graduate trainees access to
more jobs. It should be noted that the Boston EDIC fell into
this program by default rather than by planning and following
through on their strategy.
As mentioned, the Lynn and Wareham EDICs are not nearly as
large or complicated as Boston's. In particular, Wareham's
EDIC is the mainstay of Wareham's economic development program
and is integrated with the other town departments and agencies
involved. Lynn, while it does have many of the same
affiliates as Boston, still has a very minimal staff for
operation. Its strategy is to most efficiently use its staff
for the many overlapping functions that the various
organizations have.
The elements described above set the stage for how and what
can be done through implementation. These intrinsic qualities
and external conditions directly affect the implementation
process and outcome. They also, at least partially, dictate
which tools will be used by the different EDICs. As seen, the
environment sets the stage for and dictates the direction of
the implementation strategy. The powers given the EDICs are
the tools they use to implement the strategy.
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Tools
In Chapter III the powers of an EDIC are described. It is
these powers that enable the EDIC to implement its strategy
and ultimately achieve its goals. In Table 2, the powers used
by an EDIC, given its individual circumstances, are outlined.
It is the difference in their respective environments that
dictate this choice.
For instance, Lynn has little land available for industrial
development. It is more likely to use eminent domain to
obtain the property to achieve its public purpose than either
of the other two cases. In fact, Lynn used eminent domain
three times, for three out of their five major projects.
Boston used eminent domain only once, on the Digital site, and
it was not contested as in Lynn. It was done as an
expeditious way to obtain the land with clear title.
Not all the EDICs choose to construct and improve
facilities. Wareham, unlike Boston, does not have existing
buildings to improve. Nor does Wareham desire to lease,
manage, or construct.s industrial buildings. Its market
dictates that they sell the land to businesses who will build
and manage the site.
Boston is the most active in managing and operating
projects. Lynn only manages its commercial fishing pier, it
contracts management companies to do the other projects. Of
course, Lynn has a much smaller staff and operating budget
which may influence this decision.
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All the EDICs have obtained grants and borrowed capital to
fund projects, but only Boston has floated bonds. Boston had
two projects strong enough to support the bonds--for the Army
Base building and for Digital in the Crosstown Industrial
Park. In Wareham there may have been another complication,
the 121C legislation is flawed. Wareham's Ex-Director Jack
Healey had considered floating a bond but didn't do so because
of this problem. In general, floating a bond is very
difficult unless there is a strong project, which has strong
backing with a reasonable pay-back. This is similar to how
the private sector finances projects.
There are certain tools which all three EDICs choose to
use. All three developed economic development plans which
defined the actions to be pursued for different projects.
They all did some infrastructure improvements. These were
necessary to attract businesses to the industrial parks. Even
Wareham needed to construct roads and other site improvements.
And all three needed some form of marketing to find and
attract the firms theyswanted.
Although not explicitly defined in the legislation, Boston
also provided technical assistance and job training to
accomplish its goals. Because of the circumstances in Boston,
these two areas were logical extensions of their strategy.
Lynn also offered technical assistance.
While eminent domain and bonding are the first EDIC powers
listed by directors describing EDIC capabilities, they are
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not necessarily the ones that make a major impact on an EDICs'
success. An EDIC differs from other public authorities, for
example Port or Transportation Authorities, which depend
heavily on these powers. An EDIC is not usually assembling
as large a parcel of land or trying to raise as much capital
since its projects tend to be smaller and more contained;
therefore, it is easier for an EDIC to find alternative
solutions. It is the broad combination of development powers,
from land assembly to management, that makes them unique from
other economic development agencies and gives them the ability
to succeed.
Each EDIC's strategy is influenced by environmental
factors, which also determine the tools used by the EDICs for
their respective implementation. Above and beyond these two
areas, there is an overlay of factors that impact the success
of an EDIC. These are described next.
Organizational Factors
Throughout the numerous interviews, certain organizational
factors in the implementation process predominated, indicating
success or failure. Therefore, incorporating these factors
into the strategy ensures successful implementation. These
include attracting the appropriate leadership and skills,
maintaining flexibility and adaptability, capacity building,
and working well within the political framework. Although not
necessarily organizational factors, finding a good project,
targeting appropriate businesses, and financing have been
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included here because these issues also must be addressed by
the organization to ensure success.
Because an EDIC is formed principally for its industrial
development capabilities, it is logical that finding a good
project is a crucial element. A successful project is
important for a number of reasons. First, it can directly
accomplish the goal by supplying needed jobs and tax base
dollars. Second, the excess cash flow from a successful
project can be used to leverage other projects and programs
to support the goal. Third, it brings credibility to and
improves the image of the city, the EDIC, and the industrial
area, which indirectly draws more support and ultimately more
resources to the city.
The important question becomes what makes a good project.
As indicated by the case studies, there are certain elements
that characterize a good project. These include: size and
location, ability to reach self-sufficiency, manageability,
and cost-efficiency.
Size and location are important because of a need for
visibility. When the project is large enough to have a big
impact on the area and/or is in a very visible location, the
project becomes easier to promote. Promotion helps gather
political, business, and public support to build the
resources. Location is also an important because it is a main
determinant in a firm's decision to move to an area.
Boston's BMIP is a good example of this. Not only is this
project very visible from downtown Boston, but the size in
terms of firms (over 80 tenants) and jobs (approximately 4000)
located in the park is high, garnering political, business and
public support for its success.
Another characteristic of a good project is the ability to
reach self-sufficiency as soon as possible. In an era of
budget problems, a project that pays for itself and also
generates a positive cash flow to start other projects, brings
credibility and more support. Again, BMIP is a good example
since its cash flow covers costs of the park and the
operations of the EDIC.
Manageability is also an important element of a good
project. The project should be accomplished in workable
pieces. The BMIP was successful, in part because they broke
the project down into small pieces, incrementally building the
park into what it is today. The Boston DDIC failed to do this
with its Newmarket Industrial Project.
Lastly, a good project is cost-effective at achieving its
goal. The object is to produce the goals at a cost that does
not exceed the benefits of the project. Lynn was unable to
complete the America East Project, the first one attempted,
because of unanticipated environmental clean-up costs. Lynn
did not have the funds, nor could they justify raising the
funds to cover these additional costs when comparing them to
the benefit of the completed project to the community.
Another component of successful implementation strategy is
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targeting appropriate businesses. There are two main
elements. The first is finding firms that match the needs of
the community. This happens when the mandated goals of the
EDIC are achieved and there is a net positive impact on the
environment and quality of life of the town's citizens. The
second characteristic is responding to the needs of these
businesses, whether in providing services, infrastructure,
lower rent, technical help, or financing, so as to attract and
nurture the businesses.
Wareham carefully analyzed its competitive advantages and
disadvantages to determine the type of industrial firms it
could expect to attract to help build its industrial base.
Wareham did not try to attract large, high-tech firms, nor did
it try to attract tenants to lease the space rather than buy
it. Instead, Wareham targeted light manufacturing for the
Phase I Industrial Park and warehouses and distribution
centers for their Phase II Industrial Park. The industrial
park's covenants help maintain the environment and quality of
life the town desires..
Leadership, particularly at the very early stages of the
EDIC's creation, has a crucial role. A previous Boston EDIC
director mentioned that Chicago has been trying to establish
an EDIC for years but has never had the leader to put it all
together. Boston very definitely had such a leader in George
Seybolt, the original chairman of the Boston EDIC board.
At the inception stage, the organization depends on and is
built by its creator and leader. The creator's vision,
energy, and skills bring an EDIC into existence. Seybolt was
the driving force that nurtured Boston's EDIC during the first
crucial years. It was through his close personal friendship
with Mayor Kevin White and his ties with the business
community that gave the EDIC the leverage to succeed and grow.
Until approximately 1976 the survival of the EDIC was
uncertain, but Seybolt's determination kept it alive. This
can be a double edged sword, as was the case here, because the
EDIC became known as Seybolt's pet project and initially did
not gain the respect of the city government as a separate and
viable agency.
Wareham is also a good example of the need for leadership.
Until 1976, Wareham had a board of directors, but no staff to
follow through on their recommendations. In 1976 it obtained
the funds to hire a director and were finally able to
accomplish their goals. Shortly after the director was hired,
he obtained the funds to buy land for the EDIC's first
industrial park.
The leader of an EDIC plays the role of cheerleader and
promoter. The leader must assume resource building and
coordinating roles, amassing all the talent and resources
together and encouraging them to grow. It is the leader who
ultimately must develop, carry out and promote the strategy.
Another important factor in the implementation of EDICs is
attracting the proper skills to finance, market, and develop
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projects. Every director interviewed mentioned that having
a skilled and varied staff was crucial to the EDIC's survival.
If the skills are not available to implement the strategy, the
chances of success are reduced.
Since financing can make or break the development of a
property, having the expertise to plan and obtain financing
is crucial. In Boston's case, Michael Westgate, the EDIC
Director from 1975 to 1978, had a strong financial background,
which helped him obtain good terms on the mortgage for the
BMIP. Currently BMIP generates the majority of the cash flow
for Boston's EDIC.
Financing is not the only skill necessary. Other skills
include marketing, development, property management, and
economic development. Wareham has a skilled director in
economic development, who is an ex-EOCD staff planner and who
had worked on EOCD's EDIC programs and understood how the
grant process worked.
As just indicated, financing EDIC carrying costs and
projects is also a crucial factor in implementation. Without
funds there can be no development, so obviously it is a
crucial element of the implementation strategy. These three
cases were all created during the 1970's when federal and
state funds were still available and they all took full
advantage of them. Now their primary source of funds is their
cash flow. When projects are to be done, public financing
cannot be counted on, as Boston's failure with their Newmarket
89
project affirms. Private financing is necessary which means
that the projects are done for their economic merits and must
show a profit despite their public purpose.
Maintaining flexibility and innovativeness have also helped
make for successful implementation. With changes over time
and unforeseen events, the ability to adapt becomes increasing
important for survival. One such event was the Tax Reform Act
in 1986 which severely limited the use of industrial revenue
bonds as a means to arrange for inexpensive capital for
expansion. And, as finding funds becomes harder, creativity
will be all that much more important for EDICs to obtain
needed funding for projects. Fewer projects have been
initiated since 1986.
Another example of flexibility can be seen in Lynn. Lynn
has liberally interpreted the legislation of EDICs and focused
on any development that might improve industrial development,
even if only indirectly. For instance their use of the EDIC
and the powers of eminent domain for the Heritage Park does
not directly involve industrial development. However, it is
a catalyst for economic development which would benefit
industry as well as the more direct benefactors of the
commercial and residential markets.
Lynn's adaptability was also demonstrated when one of its
projects, originally planned as mixed use for clean, light
manufacturing, did not prove feasible. Instead, the land was
leased to a private developer who developed the land and
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buildings and now manages 412 units of affordable housing.
Boston's job training program, export assistance program,
and in its joint efforts with the MBTA to develop land are
examples of its flexibility. The job training program itself
has changed over the years to include not only the heavy
trades, but also courses for medical secretaries and for
business machine repair and for basic english and math.
Therefore, a strategy must be robust, with the ability to
survive change and to adapt to new circumstances and
unforeseen events. The ability to be creative with its
solutions gives the EDIC the ability to survive within this
environment. When developing a strategy, this robustness,
flexibility, and creativity should be fostered.
Capacity building is important not only to achieve the
goals, but to enable businesses and citizens of the town to
grow on their own. The directors interviewed cultivated and
expanded the existing resources. Much of this includes
ensuring political, business, and constituent support. With
limited resources at their disposal, it becomes increasingly
important to leverage whatever support they can to achieve
their goals.
Because of the lack of sophistication of Wareham's citizens
and politicians, the Wareham CDD staff feels the need to
educate the town in economic development and often has an
advisory role. Lynn has spent much energy promoting and
helping small business growth, with such projects as the J.B.
Blood incubator building, to create a more diversified
economic base. Boston has also had a number of capacity
building programs, including its job training program, an
export assistance program, and roundtable meetings with the
neighborhoods surrounding the projects.
Lastly, political support is required. All the directors
and ex-directors interviewed mentioned this as an important
factor to success. In particular, political support without
interference is crucial. Boston is a prime example of this,
with the relationship of Seybolt and ex-Mayor White. The
Boston EDIC has had adversarial roles with the BRA and
Massport for many years. Over time these relationships have
been improved. However, because there is a history of an
adversarial relationship between the state legislature and the
mayor of Boston, the EDIC must negotiate carefully to keep
everyone happy and get their support.
Conclusion
EDICs are faced with many obstacles to implementation, none
more prevalent than the fact that their strategy is in direct
opposition to the national economic trends leading to the
deindustrialization of the United States. Despite this, an
EDIC can be successful, as indicated by the case studies.
When planning an implementation strategy three sets of
factors must be evaluated. The first set--environmental--
includes the initial conditions and constraints that impact
the available resources. These environmental elements
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influence which and how EDIC powers get used. These powers
are the second set of factors, and ultimately it is these
tools that perform the tasks that achieve the desired
objectives. Lastly, the third set of factors--organizational
factors--are an overlay on the implementation strategy
process, without which there would not be success.
Each strategy must be tailor-made to fit the environmental
factors of the given city. The elements that differentiate
the implementation strategy include: size, location, access,
industrial base, macroeconomic trends, land availability, and
stage of growth of the EDIC.
In order to ensure that a desired goal is achieved, it is
important to have a clear strategy in mind. Often, this is
not the case and EDICs respond to circumstances rather than
proactively planning and implementing projects and programs.
For instance, Boston has been actively searching for other
projects and has realized that it doesn't have to act in a
vacuum when trying to acquire land. It has found a way to
exchange resources with the MBTA--MBTA land and EDIC
development expertise. Lynn on the other hand has not
developed an active plan to develop projects and instead
supports other economic development organizations. Soon Lynn
will have an abundance of underutilized industrial space and
no strategy to deal with it. Although the EDIC is not
required or even able to deal with every industrial property
that comes on the market, certain key firms and sites need to
be addressed. With the Norelco plant closing and General
Electric cutting back in its facility, Lynn has two prime
candidates.
In conclusion, there are certain elements of this process
that warrant mentioning. The first is that leadership is
necessary to influence and guide the efforts and to execute
the implementation strategy. It is not enough to have a board
of directors. As in the cases of Wareham and Boston, until
a director was in place little was accomplished. Leadership
provides the daily commitment that a board of directors lacks.
The directors are paid and given day-to-day responsibility of
accomplishing the tasks set out in the implementation
strategy. Boards of directors are unpaid and are chosen for
different reasons than the directors are chosen. Their
function is to provide direction and to act as a resource (ie.
financial or political). In contrast, a director often is
chosen for his/her emotional dedication to the organization.
Each municipality has its own specific set of goals when
establishing an EDIC, and understanding this motivation helps
define the strategy. For instance, Boston has a strong need
to supply jobs for its underutilized workers, but its tax base
is relatively stable due to office space speculation. Wareham
and Lynn on the other hand are motivated by increasing the
tax base as well as creating and retaining jobs. This means
that they will choose a strategy that will balance the two
goals while Boston will choose one that directs itself to
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supplying jobs to workers.
When planning an implementation strategy, an EDIC should
determine the initial conditions and resources. These
environmental factors indicate the competitive advantages of
a city and the obstacles it must face in order to achieve
success. They influence the use of the available powers to
accomplish the desired objective.
Another element in the implementation process is that the
EDICs do not depend on their powers of eminent domain or bond
issuance for success, but rather it is their broad combination
of development powers that has helped them succeed. EDICs
have a full range of powers for development that no other
public or quasi-public agency has. To make the most effective
use of an EDIC, the development tools that best leverage the
existing conditions towards the desired goals are chosen.
Boston has acquired and sold land, constructed facilities and
infrastructure, and managed property. Wareham's industrial
market cannot support the lease of industrial space, so it
has acquired and spld land and made infrastructure
improvements, but has not constructed facilities or managed
property. An EDIC is mandated to nurture and expand
businesses and does so through its development powers.
The public sector has become involved in industrial
development as a way to leverage private sector involvement.
If the process did not have barriers, such as financial and
political, then the private sector would be involved.
However, the process is complex and has barriers that keep the
private sector from entering, so the public sector intervenes.
The private sector sees the projects an EDIC is set up to do
as high risk, with low return. Thus, an EDIC is taking a risk
that the private sector is not willing to take.
However, EDICs are not necessarily taking the risks they
were set up to take. Because they are becoming increasingly
dependent on private sector financing, they must act more like
a private developer. Motivation for private financing
decisions are based on profits, and this will not always
result in the same decisions as ones that are based on public
benefits. Therefore, EDICs find themselves in a dilemma of
being created to take risks, but being constrained from doing
so by their financing.
Often this lack of risk taking manifests itself in the
choice of projects undertaken. An EDIC is set up for
development and therefore concentrates its efforts on this
function. The projects must meet the private sectors levels
of approval to obtain financing. EDICs search for such
projects as a focus of the investment of the town's limited
resources. These projects should also have the ability to be
self-sufficient, be manageable and cost-effective, and have
good visibility in terms of size and location.
An EDIC is ultimately attempting to nurture and grow
businesses through industrial development so it is critical
to analyze the market to (a) find an appropriate match of
business to city goals, and (b) determine what needs to be
done to attract and retain these firms. The development
process will not reach the desired goals unless this research
has been done and acted upon.
Lastly, because the development process is so complex, it
is necessary to secure political, business, and public
support. This support is necessary to build resources and
survive the delays and obstacles along the way.
Despite the fact there are many obstacles in the way of an
EDIC's success, an EDIC can achieve its desired goals as seen
by the three case studies. Through careful planning of its
strategy and proper implementation, EDICs can provide the
public benefits they were designed to provide.
APPENDIX
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COMPARISON OF THE POWERS OF VARIOUS ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Source: Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs,
"Organizing for Economic Development: Case Study, Wareham,
Massachusetts"' Local Assistance Series Publication No. 5
(August 1976) .
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